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LOOKING AHEAD TO THE END OF TRUSTEESHIP, 
TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 
Nearly nine years have passed since the Congress of Micronesia began 
negotiations with the United States government on the future political status of the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands after the termination of the present 
Trusteeship Agreement. In the meantime, the T. T.P.I. has acquired the distinction 
of bF:ing the only one of the 11 post-Wodd War II UN trust territories to remain in 
that political1imbo. Just two years ago the U.S. Administration proposed 1981 as 
the date at which the present trusteeship status would come to an end, but recent 
political currents have left Micronesia's political future three years hence more 
uncertain than ever. 
From the very outset of its status negotiations with the U.S., Micronesian 
representatives have been bargaining for Free Association-a loose relationship 
with the U.S. in which the latter would assume responsibility for overseeing the 
islands' foreign affairs and defence, while also providing a stipulated amount of 
financial assistance each year. I Work on the Compact of Free Association had 
been progressing slowly but steadily until formal negotiations sputtered to a 
complete halt in late 1973 after the Seventh Round of the Status Talks. The 
alJeged reason for the breakdown of the talks was a major disagreement between 
the U.S. and Micronesia over the amount of financial assistance to be offered under 
Frep. Association.2 It was almost three years before formal negotiations were 
resumed in May 1976 and a mutualJy acceptable definition of future U.S. budgetary 
assistance to Micronesia reached.3 Changes were made in the draft compact at the 
Eighth Round of the Status Talks to give the government of Micronesia wider 
latitude in foreign affairs and to meet other demands of Micronesian negotiators. 
Just as momentum seemed to be restored, however, key persons on both negotiating 
teams were replaced-U.S. Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams was recalJed 
shortly before the change in administration that came with the election of 
President Carter, while Senator Lazarus Salii, the Chairman of the Joint 
Committee on Future Status, was replaced by former Senator Andon Amaraich, 
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who was appointed to preside over an entirely new Committee created by the 
Congress of Micronesia. 
But it is neither the turnover on the negotiating team nor the continuing 
debate over such controversial points as jurisdiction over the 200-mile off-shore 
economic zone that has presented the greatest obstacle to recent progress in the 
Status Talks. The political tensions within Micronesia itself have proved the 
greatest hurdle. The past three years have seen the growth of strong separatist 
movements in the two administrative districts of Palau and the Marshalls, as well 
as HIe complete breakaway of the Northern Marianas from the rest of the Trust 
Territory. The Northern Marianas, which as early as 1971 had formally made 
l<nown its desire to secede from the Trust Territory and to seek a c\o')er 
relJtionship with the U.S., had its Covenant of Commonwealth approved by the U.S. 
Congress in March 1976. With a solid 78% of the Northern Marianas population 
voting in favour of the Covenant in a special referendum, there was little that evpn 
the staunchest advocates of Micronesian unity in Washington could do to oppose the 
rati fication. The following month the Marianas were placed under a separate 
provisional government, with Erwin D. Canham named as Resident Cornmissioncr.4 
The Congress of Micronesia (COM), which had strongly opposed the separatist 
tendencies in the Marianas from the very beginning, finally bowed to the 
inevitable-while recording its own strong objection to the separation of the 
Marianas prior to the actual termination of the Trusteeship.5 
Even before the referendum approving the Covenant for the Norther II 
Marianas, there were already loud rumblings in Palau and the Murshalls inclic,~tt illg 
the desire of each of these districts for separate negotiations wi th the U.S. Ttle~,e 
rumblings have grown into something of a roar in the past year or two. In I\\.:ircll 
1974 the Marshall Islands District Legislature adopted a resolution informing the 
United Nations that it intended to begin its own negotiations with the U.S.6 At till' 
time the Marshalls, which was generating a major share of the COM's income (dX 
revenues through its U.S.-operated missile base on Kwajalein, were deep in contli,.:t 
with the Congress over revenue-shar ing. Even after the COM p.:lssed legi SL.l t i on 
that turned over to the district legislature half of all locally generated r(~V('I)lj(', the 
sep.1ratlst movement in the Marshalls continued to grow in strength. The II!I tl..tl 
reaction of the lJ.S. to continuing demands from the Marshalls fN ScpiHdle 
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negotiations was to reject them out of hand as incompatible with the unity of the 
islands that was envisioned in the Trusteeship Agreement. The precedent of the 
Marianas' breakaway, of course, made this argument less than convincing to 
MarshaHese separatists. 
By the summer of 1975 Palau had formally submitted its own request for 
separate negotiations. Like the Marshalls, Palau quickly formed its own Political 
Status Commission which it hoped to employ as a negotiating team as soon as the 
U.S. yielded to its demands for separate talks, and authorized a non-binding 
referendum in the district to gauge-or perhaps display--the strength of popular 
separatist desires. The returns of the Palau referendum held in September 1976 
showed 88% in favour of separation, whUe the vote taken in the MarshalJs in July 
1977 yielded a 62% majority for separation? Despite the very substantial support 
for separation in Palau and the Marshalls, both districts contain opposition groups 
that have become ever more vociferous in their stand in favour of Micronesian 
unity--notably the 'Voice of the Marshalls' group and an anti-separation faction 
from Pelilieu Island in Palau. 
Growth of separatist tendencies in both districts seems to be solidly rooted 
in economic considerations. When the U.S. military first publicly presented its 
future land requirements in Micronesia during the Fifth Round of the Status Talks 
in July 1972, it specified Palau, the MarshaUs and the Northern Marianas as those 
districts where it wished to acquire or retain the use of existing land and harbour 
rights.8 Along with the military's request, of course, went the unspoken guarantee 
that the U.S. government would pay well for lease rights to those military retention 
areas. When the potential tax revenue from the American military or civilian 
population that would staff those bases was counted in, the U.S. defence requests 
appeared to be an economic bonanza. For Palau, however, there was an even 
greater economic boon in the offing. In 1975 Palauan officials were approached by 
Japanese business interests--chieily the Nissho-Iwai Corporation and the Industrial 
Bank of Japan-with a proposal to build a one-half biHion dollar supertanker port 
and oil storage facility on Palau.9 The proposed complex would caU for utilization 
of large tracts of land on Babeldaop, the largest island in Palau, and would employ 
12,000 persons when in full operation-nearly the equivalent of the district's 
present population. The proposed superport has in the last two years become a 
controversial issue in its own right. The leadership of Palau, which has come out 
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almost unanimously in support of political autonomy separate from the rest ot 
Micronesia appears to be divided over the superport; several of the traditiondl 
leaders are opposed to the plan because of what they regard as its harmful 
environmental and social impact on the island group. At present the Issue is still 
being debated, while the Nissho-Iwai Corporation completes the environmental 
impact study that it has undertaken at the request of the Trust Territory 
Adm inistration. 
The separatist desires of Palau and the Marshalls, which at first were largely 
ignored by the U.S. while the overtures of these districts for separate status 
negotiations were repeatedly spurned, have of late become too loudly and 
insistently voiced to be disregarded any longer. Although the U.S. has continually 
reiterated in official statements its wish to see the remaining districts of the Trust 
Territory retain some form of political unity at the termination of the Trusteeship, 
it has lately softened its once strong stanc:e against separate negotiations ot any 
sort. Shortly after his appointment in 1977, the U.S. Representative to the U.S.-
Micronesian Status Talks, Ambassador Peter Rosenblatt, announced that teams 
from Palau and the Marshalls would be admitted to future status negotiations. 10 
The Congress of Micronesia and its Commission on Future Political Status and 
Transition would continue to represent only the four central districts of Yap, Truk, 
Po nape and Kosrae. 11 Informal talks, under this arrangement, resumed in Molokai 
in October 1977, although no substantive agreement was reached on any of the key 
issues. With the presence of three district negotiating teams from Micronesia-all 
(~urrently attempting to work out some form of Free Association with the U.S.---the 
talks have necessarily become two-tiered. The U.S. has officially staten its 
willingness to negotiate a single basic document defining its future political 
relationship with the six districts and proposes to use the still unfinislwd draft 
Compact of Free Association as the working basis for this relationship. To 
dccommodate the desire of the Palau and Marshalls delegation for greater 
autonomy, however, certain portions of the document would cover tho~e unif]ue 
aspects of the relationship applicable to each of the three negotiating parties. The 
new structure for the Status Talks leaves the door open for any other district to 
begin to negotiate with the U.S. on a bilateral basis, providing that it continues to 
participate in the multi-lateral negotiations along with the rest of Microllf'si..l. 
Through the compromise structure that has been recently adopted for talks, the 
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u.s. clearly hopes to encourage the districts to establish a common political entity 
of some sort-however tenuous-while seeking to honour the cries of the two 
separatist districts for a greater measure of political autonomy. 
A lingering question of substantial importance to the success of the Status 
Talks, now that they have been resumed, is what is to be done with the Micronesian 
Constitution. In the summer of 1975 representatives from all the districts, 
including the Marianas, met for three months to assmeble what was designated 'The 
Constitution for the Federated States of Micronesia'. The Constitution as drafted 
provides for a parliamentarian central government with limited powers over the 
districts or 'states'. Inasmuch as the constitution is to be the 'supreme law of the 
Federated States of Micronesia',12 any agreements between Micronesia and other 
nations--notably the U.S.-would be bound to conform to it. Seemingly shelved 
during the height of the separatist crisis, the issue of the Constitution has again 
emerged as a critical one. The Constitution is to be presented to aU the districts in 
a referendum scheduled for 12 July 1978, and if ratified by them it will take effect 
within a year. 
Ambassador Rosenblatt, like his predecessor F. Haydn Williams, holds that 
the draft Constitution is 'almost at complete variance' with the Free Association 
that has been the subject of negotiations for several years past, since the 
C o. ld dOh MO ° 13 U S onstltutlOn wou accor sovereIgnty to t e lcroneslan government. • • 
negotiators maintain that according to the terms of Free Association, sovereignty 
would reside in the U.S. government. On several occasions recently the U.S. has 
insisted that supremacy be given to the Compact of Free Association in areas 
where its provisions might conflict with the Constitution. 14 The Congress of 
Micronesia is reluctant to go as far as the U.S. would like in this matter, but it has 
amended the mandate given to its own Commission on Future Political Status and 
Transition to allow it to negotiate without feeling constrained by the provisions of 
the draft Constitution. 15 Status Talks can now proceed freely for a time without 
any reference to the Constitution, but eventually the question as to which 
document shall have precedence over the other must be raised again-and 
answered. 
As attempts to work out a clear foumula for the future political status of 
the T.T.P.I. continue, efforts are being made to provide a solid economic base for a 
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future government. For an island territory that exports a mere $6 miUion in copra 
and fish while importing $38 million worth of foreign goods, this is no smal1 
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order. For years the Trust Territory government has been the preponderant 
factor in the Micronesian economy, employing about as many persons as does the 
entire private sector. Yearly T.T. budget increases, combined more recently with 
funds from ever proliferating U.S. federal programmes, appear to have retarded 
rather than stimulated genuine economic productivity. 
Faced with this unpromising situation and a 1981 termination date for the 
Trusteeship, the Congress of Micronesia contracted in 1976 with the United Nations 
DeveloPrr'ent Programme to prepare a five-year economic plan for Micronesia that 
would help to make the new government of Micronesia self-supporting. A group of 
International experts who were brought to the Trust Territory to work on the study 
produced an Indicative Development Plan (lOP) that, with minor changes, was 
approved by COM and submitted to the districts for adaptation and implementation 
on the local level. The two basic objectives of the lOP, as stated in the 
Introduction to the Plan, are: 
to correct the present imbalances in the economy .•. [ requIring ] a 
reallocation of resources away from unproductive government expenditures 
and toward the productive sectors: ••. and to stimulate more production 
and raise per capita income levels • • • [with] high pr\o/ity on the 
development of Micronesia's marine and agricultural resources. 
Some of the major recommendations made in the lOP have already been at 
least partiaUy implemented. Recent legislation by the COM has increased the 
inc-2orne tax rate and given Micronesia a simple but graduated tax scale. Certdin 
government departments, particularly the Department of Health Services, have 
increased their fees beyond the former nominal charges in an effort to recoup d 
gredter percentage of their costs. A serious effort to lower the cost of 
government, however, will require a reduction in the number of Micronesians and 
expatriates on the government payroll-possibly combined with a lowering of the 
inflated salaries-inflated in terms of what Micronesia can afford-that are now 
being paid. The threat of civil suits by public school teachers in three dl!>trlcts 
when a mandatory 'furlough without pay' was announced may have discouraged 
fmther attempts to cut back pay levels or to make slashes in the government \I/ork 
I~)rce So far there have been no serious attempts to restrict importation of goods 
lh;:.tt might be produced locally, nor has there been G noticeable incr<:a~(' if I 
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agricultural and marine productivity. At this time it appears that legislators and 
administrators are still undecided on whether to put into effect the unpopular 
austerity measures that are required to fully implement the lOP and bring, 
Micronesia closer to full self-support, or to walk the easier path of growing 
reliance on U.S. financial aid. 
Much of Micronesia's hope for future economic prosperity has been pinned on 
the outcome of the series of Law of the Sea conferences sponsored by the UN, at 
which representatives from all corners of the globe have been trying to draw up an 
international treaty to govern the distribution and use of ocean resources. If, as is 
expected, the international law should eventually establish a 12-mile territorial 
limit in offshore waters and I88-mile exclusive economic resource zone, land-poor 
Micronesia would become ocean-rich. All fishing rights (except for certain 
migrating species) as well as undersea mineral rights over an expanse of waters 
amounting to nearly two million square miles would belong to Micronesia. The 
potential wealth from such a vast resource would, many Micronesian leaders 
anticipate, enable its new government to become entirely self-supporting. 
Understandably, Micronesian interest in the progress of the Conference has been 
keen. 
In August 1972 the COM created its own Joint Committee on the Law of the 
Sea, which almost immediately began meetings with the U.S. delegation to the 
Conference in the hope of having the Micronesian position promoted at forthcoming 
international meetings. 18 As the marked difference between the U.S. and 
Micronesian positions became clear, Micronesian legislators petitioned the U.S. for 
separate representation at future sessions of the Conference. After refusing this 
request on at least two separate occasions, the U.S. finally reluctantly agreed to 
allow the Joint Committee to represent the Micronesian position at the 1974 
meeting in Caracas, Venezuela. Thereafter a Micronesian delegation has attended 
the Conference in a non-voting observer status. In October 1977 legislation passed 
by the COM was signed into law by the High Commissioner establishing a 200-mile 
fisheries zone around the islands of Micronesia and authorizing the newly created 
Micronesian Maritime Authority to regulate this zone. 19 This law represents the 
first attempt by the COM to legislate Micronesian control of its offshore waters 
according to the 200-mile zone concept that has gained wide acceptance at the 
Law of the Sea Conference. 
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The issue is by no means settled, however, An earlier version of this recent 
legislation was vetoed by the High Commissioner, in part because it provided lor 
direct negotiations between Micronesia and foreign governments over the conn's-
sion of fishing and mineral rights. The question of whether Micronesia shall be 
granted full jurisdiction over the 200-mile economic zone under Free Association is 
still under dispute at the Status Talks, with the U.S. maintaining that Micronesian 
control could conflict with U.S. responsibilities under the foreign affairs and 
defence clauses of the Compact. Implicit in this controversy, of course, is the 
broader issue of the measure of sovereignty that the Micronesian government--or 
governments--can expect to exercise at the end of the Trusteeship. After nine 
years of negotiations, this question is far from being answered. 
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Committee on Future Status, Draft Compact of Free Association ... 
Presented to the Congress of Micronesia, Saipan, Aug. 1972. 
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